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THE JURISPRUDENCE OF WRINGING HANDS: A
BRIEF RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR SOIFER
ALLAN IDES*

As I read it, the gist of Professor Soifer's essay is that the modern

Supreme Court has not lived up to the promise of footnote four in the
Carolene Products case.1 In particular, according to Professor Soifer, the
current members of the Court are insensitive to the interests of various
involuntary groups and perhaps willfully ignorant of the relevant historical
and contemporary contexts within which such groups exist. The thesis is
apparently proved through Professor Soifer's treatment of several recent
decisions indicative of this trend. The treatment of these cases is, however,
superficial and misleading. The overall approach is one of hyperbole rather
than of careful consideration. Although it is true that the current composition of the Court does not conform to Professor Soifer's version of
judicial and political liberalism, it does not necessarily follow that the Court
has descended to the abysmal depths suggested in Professor Soifer's strongly
worded polemic. Certainly nothing said in his essay will convince anyone
other than the previously anointed; indeed, the essay, which moves forward
with a series interlocking generalizations, makes one dubious of one's own
liberal proclivities, though I doubt this was the intended effect. Having read
the piece several times, I am left perplexed. Aside from the academically
fashionable criticism of a conservative Court, what was to be accomplished?
What were we to learn? What strategies are available to counter the perceived
ill-advised trends? Shall we gather together and bemoan the passing of the
Warren Court? In short, beyond an exercise in verbal catharsis, what was
the point? The essay is all the more perplexing, since it does not follow
through on its promise to disclose the "profoundly ahistorical approach of
judges today.." 2 The notion seems to be that it is enough to state the
accusations with cynical assurance and clever phrasing; truth apparently lies
within the verbal candy which the reader is invited to ingest.
Before entering a more specific discussion, a few preliminary comments
seem appropriate. To begin with, I have great reservations about the overall
tone of Professor Soifer's essay, a tone I found both smug and intellectually
arrogant. The topic is, generally speaking, equal protection. Surely an area
of grave importance to our nation and one in which a myriad of solutions
may be appropriate. But Professor Soifer's essay does not strike me as an
* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law.
I. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The essay
actually carries its thesis beyond the Supreme Court to Anglo-American judges in general. The

main thrust, however, seems directed at the current composition of the United States Supreme
Court.
2. Soifer, On Being Overly Discrete and Insular: Involuntary Groups and the AngloAmerican Judicial Tradition, 48 WAs-. & LEE L. REv. 381, 382 (1991).
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invitation to enter into a discourse on this topic. Indeed, the impression is
just the opposite. The effort seems to be toward silencing the opposition
by rhetorical flourishes that deny any possibility of an intelligent, contrary
view. The essay is also premised on the stuffy notion that Americans are
"notoriously" ignorant of their past and that the current members of the
Court are either too foolish or "willfully blind" to appreciate, for example,
the long, pathetic and horrible history of racial discrimination in this
country. I know that many people, and particularly those in academia,
share this bleak and self-congratulatory view of their fellow citizens and of
the Court. I am not, however, certain that this is anything more than a
gross caricature. The public response to Ken Burns' series on the Civil War,
for example, demonstrated a thirst for understanding our past. This may
not prove that America is a stew of historical intellectualism, but it suggests
a few more ingredients in the recipe than the empty pot suggested by
Professor Soifer's offhanded remarks. I suppose this uni-dimensional caricature of the unwashed masses is one of the few remaining acceptable
stereotypes of involuntary groups. I don't buy it. Finally, although I often
find myself in disagreement with the decisions of the current Supreme
Court, I think one errs fundamentally by assuming that the members of
the Court are craven simpletons, in this case, simpletons who lack the
ability or desire to appreciate history as it relates to the problems of race
and other involuntary groupings. The long and short of this is the fact that
the Supreme Court may be wrong in a particular case or line of cases, or,
perhaps more accurately, the fact that one disagrees with the Court should
be an occasion to enter upon a discourse not to post a broadside that
assumes contrary views are premised in ignorance. The issues are simply
too complicated to be understood or advanced by such generalities. The
turn of a nice phrase is not a substitute for critical assessment. Nor is it a
substitute for proposing some practical agenda to ameliorate the perceived
evils. The communal wringing of hands simply gets us nowhere.
On the merits, the essay revolves around footnote four from United
States v. Carolene Products Co., a case in which the Court established the
general principle that legislative acts are presumptively constitutional. I think
we do well to remember that footnote four is a footnote and one that had
no direct bearing on the issues before the Carolene Products Court. It is
not a sacred text. But as far as footnotes go, I must admit that it's a pretty
good one. What does it say? (Only parts of the footnote are actually quoted
in the essay.) The footnote has three paragraphs:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first
ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to
be embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring
about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more
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exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. [A
number of such restrictions are then listed: right to vote; dissemination of information; interferences with political organizations;
peaceful assembly].
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the
review of statutes directed at particular religious, ... or national,
... or racial minorities .... whether prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously
to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.'
Reading this footnote in the context of the Carolene Products holding,
namely, that legislation is normally entitled to a presumption of validity,
the overall meaning seems to be that this presumption should not apply if
legislation transgresses specific constitutional limitations, directly restricts
the political process, discriminates against religious, national or racial minorities or if it can be shown that prejudice itself has in some way
undermined the political process. This strikes me as a sensible and just
formula, consistent with the separation of powers, federalism, the Bill of
Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment and principles of representative democracy. I do not, as Professor Soifer apparently does, take this footnote to
call for the application of special rules whenever the issue of race is injected
into a legal controversy or whenever a member of an involuntary group is
a party to a lawsuit. It certainly doesn't say that. At one point, Professor
Soifer states, without any explanation or justification, "The [final] paragraph [in footnote four] suggested the need for judicial limits on permissible
democratic action, and even inaction, that perpetuated the burdens of past
victimization of special groups."'4 The italicized portion of this quote is
simply a figment of Professor Soifer's noncontextual, ahistorical and wishful
reading of footnote four. Certainly these generous interpretations present a
possible gloss upon the footnote, but a gloss that adds a new political
dimension and specifically takes the footnote out of its intended context, a
context that involves only the presumption of legislative validity. Nothing
in Professor Soifer's essay comes close to suggesting the demise of footnote
four within that specific context.
Professor Soifer's latitudinarian version of footnote four becomes apparent and transparent in his treatment of two recent civil rights decisions.
The first is Patterson v. McLean Credit Union.5 The plaintiff in Patterson
claimed that her employer violated the Civil Rights Act of 1866, codified
at 42 U.S.C. section 1981, by subjecting her to racial harassment. Such
harassment clearly violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but

3. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted).
4. Soifer, supra note 2, at 392 (emphasis added).
5. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
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the plaintiff in Patterson chose to rely upon section 1981 rather than the
somewhat more elaborate procedures required for enforcement of a Title
VII claim. Section 1981 was potentially available because of the Court's
earlier decision in Runyon v. McCrary.6 In Runyon, the Supreme Court
held that section 1981 applied to the formation of private contracts; specifically, the Court ruled that section 1981 prohibited a private party from
refusing to enter a contract due to the race of another party to the potential
contract. The question in Patterson was whether the ruling in Runyon
should be extended to claims of racial harassment. After the initial oral
argument in Patterson, the Court asked the parties to brief the advisability
of overruling Runyon. Professor Soifer notes that the Court's request
"touched off a passionate public debate."17 The passion, however, was
largely the result of a Chicken Little panic created by overdrawn rhetoric
that characterized the potential reconsideration of relatively narrow issue
(particularly narrow considering the scope of Title VII and other modern
civil rights statutes) as somehow presaging the demise of civil rights in
America.
A piece of the sky apparently fell on Professor Soifer's tail. In his
essay, he roundly and passionately criticizes the Court for daring to reconsider a prior civil rights ruling. He quotes the language from the Court's
order and takes particular umbrage with the Court's insistence that in
deciding whether to reconsider a point of law it must treat all litigants
equally. In particular, the Court insisted that the decision to reconsider a
prior ruling should be applied without regard to the race or status of the
parties. The precise question was whether an interpretation of a civil rights
statute should be entitled to greater stare decisis weight than that accorded
other statutes. Professor Soifer seems to say yes; there should be a special
judicial deference to those litigants who raise protected group rights or who
are members of a protected group. 8 Respectfully, I do not agree. I do not
believe that procedural rules, e.g., burdens of proof, sentencing guidelines,
rules regarding jurisdiction or notice, etc., should vary from one litigant to
another depending on race or status. It is one thing to say, as suggested by
Carolene Products footnote four, that courts ought to be suspicious of
statutes that classify according to race; it is quite another thing to say that
courts must take race into account in applying otherwise neutral procedural

6. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
7. Soifer, supra note 2, at 393.
8. The overblown rhetoric contained in this section of Professor Soifer's essay is
particularly unenlightening. A simple request to reconsider a point of law is transformed into
a bludgeon against the "downtrodden" and proof that judges will be "blind to what they
know as women and men." By asking for reargument on neutral terms the Court has adopted
a policy that will treat all litigants as "interchangeable ciphers." The Court "aggressively
presume[s]" with an attitude of "willed obliviousness" and so forth. This rhetoric violates the
very principle Professor Soifer asks the Court to consider in deciding a case: consideration of
context. From the narrow context of a decision to reconsider a point of law, Soifer creates a
scenario of blind, evil and uncompromising justice that rivals the most overdrawn caricatures
one can imagine.
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rules such as those above or such as the generally neutral considerations
applicable to the doctrine of stare decisis. Professor Soifer's contrary view
is an invitation to a muddled, never ending and increasingly destructive
quagmire of racial preferences.
Of course, one response to my position is that the so-called neutral
rules are not neutral at all. They are stacked against involuntary groups.
This may be Professor Soifer's view. At one point he observes, "Majoritarian politics obviously long has been-and still is-manipulated through
explicit or encoded racism." 9 If by this he means that the political process
is inherently racist, the conclusion may follow that one simply cannot rely
upon the neutrality of the playing field created through that process. This
line of thinking strikes me as fundamentally flawed and based not on reason
but, to paraphrase Professor Soifer, on liberal academic machismo. Rules
having no obvious bearing on race, for example, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, cannot be categorically dismissed as racist in the absence of
some showing of a connection between those rules and specific racial
attitudes, effects or the like. The same can be said for the doctrine of stare
decisis. There is no doubt that the doctrine can be used in a racist manner,
but in the absence of further cogent commentary, I would be reluctant to
conclude that the doctrine was itself "encoded" with racism. Simply calling
the system racist does not strike me as a particularly productive way to
address real problems of race in our society.
One additional point. The rather harsh criticism of the Court's posing
of a question seems to fall into that new category of questions we are no
longer able to ask. I reject that category. In a representative democracy
there should be no political subjects beyond the realm of discourse. All
laws are subject to challenge and revision, even those deemed most fundamental. And from a judicial perspective, no matter how uncomfortable it
may make us feel, questions of constitutional law, common law and
statutory construction are open to reinterpretation. Brown v. Board of
Education was a reinterpretation of the law; New York Times v. Sullivan
was a reinterpretation of the law; Roe v. Wade was a reinterpretation of
the law; and so on. Certainly the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence
has long operated under the presumption that judicial decisions are subject
to review and so long as the liberal model of judicial activism remains a
part of our jurisprudence, one can expect swings in both directions. That
is simply a part of the process, a process tempered by the doctrine of stare
decisis.
The Patterson Court did not, however, overrule the precedent. In fact,
the Court unanimously reaffirmed Runyon v. McCrary; the majority's
affirmance was based on long accepted principles of stare decisis. (One
might ask, "Why the continuing fuss?") I believe the Court was correct in
so doing; although, having spent some considerable time with the legislative
history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, I believe as well that Runyon was

9. Soifer, supra note 2, at 391.
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most assuredly wrongly decided. With almost remarkable clarity, that legislative history strongly supports the view that the 1866 Act was designed
precisely to attack the infamous Black Codes and nothing more. Although
that legislative history does refer to private acts of discrimination in descriptive passages regarding life in the post-Civil War South, there is not a
single statement in that history that directly supports the view that the Act
was designed to cover those private discriminations. There is no debate on

the point. Yet there is an abundance of debate directly supporting the
proposition that the sole purpose of the Act was to address government

sponsored discrimination. Considering the nature of our governmental system at that time, it would be quite surprising for Congress to
regulate private conduct without any debate on the point. On this
commend the reader to the lucid and exhaustive opinion of Justice
in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.10 After describing the legislative

directly
issue, I
Harlan
history

of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in considerable detail, Justice Harlan
concludes:
The foregoing analysis of the language, structure, and legislative

history of the 1866 Civil Rights Act shows, I believe, that the
Court's thesis that the Act was meant to extend to purely private
action is open to the most serious doubt, if indeed it does not
render that thesis wholly untenable."
I think he was right and I believe the Court in Jones and Runyon, in an
effort to "do the right thing," simply ignored that legislative history. But
12
again, I agree that the time to overhaul Runyon had long since passed.

Having reaffirmed Runyon's application of section 1981 to private
contracts, the Patterson Court went on to determine if section 1981 also

10. 392 U.S. 409, 449-80 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
11. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 473 (1968).
12. At the colloquium at which Professor Soifer's paper was presented, Professor Soifer
responded to the above comments by stating that Justice Harlan's opinion in Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co. was premised upon a historical mistake. Professor Soifer further indicated that
this mistake was exposed and discussed in an earlier article written by him. Soifer, Protecting
Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651 (1979). In preparing
this commentary, I read the earlier article. It is a vitriolic critique of Raoul Berger's Government
by Judiciary, and, although the essay criticizes Berger's historical techniques, there is not a
word about Justice Harlan's opinion in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer other than a citation in a
footnote. Since Harlan's opinion involved the meaning of a statute-the Civil Rights Act of
1866-and since Berger's book involved an interpretation of the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it would seem that a critique of Berger's work would have no necessary bearing
on Harlan's opinion. Also, since Harlan's opinion predated Berger's work, there is no reason
to suppose that Harlan was influenced by Berger. Moreover, a reading of Soifer's earlier
article does not make the connection clear. If Harlan did make a historical mistake, it just
isn't clear at this point what that mistake was. In addition, the earlier article, like the current
Soifer article, is replete with overstatements, oversimplifications and errors of logic that, taken
together, do not generate confidence in the professor's historical abilities. See Berger, Soifer
to the Rescue of History, 32 SouTm CAROINA L. REv. 427 (1981). In the absence of further
elucidation, I'll place my bet with Justice Harlan.
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covered claims of racial harassment. The Court concluded that such claims
were not actionable under section 1981. According to the Court, the
statutory language encompassed only the formation and enforcement of
contracts; its coverage did not include post formation behavior other than
actual judicial enforcement. Professor Soifer describes the Court's statutory
interpretation as formalistic and as a "remarkably pinched lexicographic
approach."' 3 I think he means that the Court interpreted the language of
the statute strictly. If so, I agree. The Court did adhere tightly to the text
of the statute, but the reason lies not in the Court's insensitivity to race or
history as Professor Soifer would have it.'4 There are two more plausible
explanations. First, the Court was saddled with construing a statute which
on its face was evidently limited to regulating government action but which
had been generously interpreted to include private conduct within its ambit.
The Court wisely chose not to reinterpret the statute, but at the same time
it chose equally wisely to circumscribe the scope of the statute's application
to this already unintended realm of private contractual relations. Second,
the Court recognized that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
specifically covered the type of conduct at issue in this case and chose to
leave redress of such conduct to the congressional scheme most clearly
designed for that purpose.
Thus, I see very little merit in Professor Soifer's suggestion that the
author of the opinion, Justice Kennedy, failed to heed and even belittled
the historic context of the 1866 Act. Quite the contrary, Justice Kennedy's
opinion actually took a more precise and, I believe, more accurate view of
the legislative history of the Act and also placed the current codification of
the Act into the modern enforcement context endorsed by Congress. One
could certainly disagree with Justice Kennedy's conclusions, but it strikes
me as wild overstatement to suggest that those conclusions are not within
the realm of reasonable discourse in a society committed to civil rights.
Professor Soifer's description of this decision as a "rout" on civil rights
simply doesn't survive even the most modest scrutiny. I would only add
that just this term in International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Johnson Controls,
Inc.,15 the Court unanimously struck down a fetal protection policy as
violative of Title VII's proscription against sex discrimination. Such a
decision hardly strikes me as an indication of a retreat from civil rights.
Rather, Johnson Controls, like Patterson, represents a careful effort to
attempt to ascertain the intended scope of congressional enactments in the
sphere of civil rights. Curious that Professor Soifer did not test his thesis
against the Johnson Controls decision.
13. Soifer, supra note 2, at 396 n.50.
14. See supra note 11. In fact, Professor Soifer's cryptic references to the legislative
history of the Act strike me as a prime example of an ahistorical approach. Overall, Professor
Soifer's approach to historical analysis seems to be premised more upon bold statement than
upon a careful study of facts.
15. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
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Finally, I would like to mention Professor Soifer's snide treatment of6
a recent affirmative action decision, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.'
In that case the Court struck down a minority set aside program for the
letting of public contracts. The Court held that such programs would run
afoul of the equal protection clause in the absence of a showing that the
governmental institution involved was attempting to remedy past discriminations within its specific jurisdiction. The Court was concerned that any
other approach would keep politics on a never ending treadmill of special
preferences. Professor Soifer reacts to this conclusion as follows, "Thus,
the history of Richmond, the capital of the Confederacy and a leading site
in resistance to school integration, was quarantined, then ignored.' ' 7 I'm
not sure of the logical connection between the Court's holding and Professor
Soifer's observation; nor is it clear how these particular historic facts were
actually relevant other than symbolically. What Richmond was over one
hundred years ago is certainly less important than what it was at the time
the set aside program was adopted. But Professor Soifer apparently agrees
with Justice Marshall that it was "insulting" for Justice O'Connor to even
note that the population of Richmond was 50% black and that 5 of the 9
city council members were black at the time the set aside program was
adopted. 8 How one is to introduce race into the equation without considering race is not explained. Apparently some contexts are to be considered
(the stereotype of bigoted Southern communities, for example) and others
may be ignored (political reality, for example). As he does so many times
in this essay, Professor Soifer turns to the clever phrase in lieu of a reasoned
discussion. The reader is expected to leap onto the bandwagon and join the
chorus bemoaning the Court's "willingness to operate in a vacuum" when
in fact the only apparent vacuum is the void beneath Professor Soifer's
rhetoric. I guess I would like to know what precise facts and reasons make
O'Connor's judgment wrong or even suspect.' 9
There is certainly a legitimate argument to be made that affirmative
action programs are suspect within the meaning of equal protection jurisprudence, and one making such an argument need not be racist or historically illiterate or even conservative. The argument is also quite consistent
with footnote four's express suspicion of factors that may pervert the

16. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
17. Soifer, supra note 2, at 397.
18. Soifer, supra note 2, at 397 n.55.
19. I must admit that my first reaction to the City of Richmond decision was negative,
and some of my doubts about the opinion linger. Why shouldn't the City of Richmond be
free to solve its problems of race in a manner it deems fit? But upon reflection, Justice
O'Connor's opinion seems to steer a sensible middle course between remedying actual past
wrongs to living individuals and measures that merely pay obeisance to the politics of preference.
It is a tough course, but probably the one most fair to all persons who will be effected. After
all, past acts of discrimination are only relevant today to the extent they injure real, living
people. The abstraction of past wrongs should not serve as the basis for determining present
day legal rights. I can see how one could differ with this view, but I find it difficult to accept
the desparate criticism that paints City of Richmond as a grim reaper of equal protection.
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political process. Race may pervert the political process in many guises,
affirmative action being one of them. For example, in the context of a law
school admissions policy the argument against affirmative action goes something like this:
The consideration of race as a measure of an applicant's qualification normally introduces a capricious and irrelevant factor working an invidious discrimination....
The key to the problem is the consideration of each application in
a racially neutral way....
There is no constitutional right for any race to be preferred. The
years of slavery did more than retard the progress of blacks. Even
a greater wrong was done the whites by creating arrogance instead
of humility and by encouraging the growth of the fiction of a
superior race. There is no superior person by constitutional standards. A [student] who is white is entitled to no advantage by
reason of that fact; nor is he subject to any disability, no matter
what his race or color. Whatever his race, he ha[s] a constitutional
right to have his application considered on its individual merits in
a racially neutral manner.
...

The Equal Protection Clause commands the elimination of

racial barriers, not their creation in order to satisfy our theory as
to how society ought to be organized ....

A segregated admissions

process creates suggestions of stigma and caste no less than a
segregated classroom, and in the end it may produce that result
despite its contrary intentions. One other assumption must be clearly
disapproved: that blacks or browns cannot make it on their individual merit. That is a stamp of inferiority that a State is not
permitted to place on any lawyer. 2o
These are the words of Justice William 0. Douglas in DuFunis v. Odegaard.21 Certainly Justice Douglas was no enemy of civil rights. Moreover,
his career did more to advance the policies of footnote four than perhaps
any other Justice. If Justice Douglas can make such an argument, perhaps,
despite the decision in City of Richmond, the death of footnote four and
the demise of civil rights have been greatly exaggerated. Perhaps Croson is
merely an example of the Court's good faith effort to grapple with a
controversial issue over which reasonable people could and do disagree.
All of this leads to Professor Soifer's ultimate objection: The approach
of the Court today wrongly emphasizes the importance of individualism
over group rights.? He writes as if there is no need to explain this critique.
20. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 33343 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted, emphasis in original).
21. Id.
22. Soifer, supra note 2, at 391 n.35, 392-93, 394 n.47, 395, and 415-18.
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Rather, Soifer simply bemoans the "recrudescence of an extreme, abstract
individualistic ethos in American courts today."3 Since "recrudescence"
means the "renewing of a disease or dangerous activity,"' ' I take it that
Professor Soifer assumes that there is something patently or dangerously
wrong with individualism. I recognize that this attitude is the current fashion
in liberal academia, but I hope that Professor Soifer's knowledge of history
at least includes some space for the importance of individualism within our
constitutional system. After all, the first paragraph of footnote four speaks
directly to individual rights such as those found in the Bill of Rights. I
would hate to see that paragraph inverted by an academic insistence upon
a communitarian ethos that overlooks the individual.
In any event, Professor Soifer concludes that the combination of
Patterson and Croson illustrates a "complete rejection of the footnote four
approach." Patterson clearly does not do this since it addresses problems
of statutory construction having nothing to do with the scope of footnote
four. Croson addresses an issue-affirmative action-that was not within
the realm of the Court's imagination in 1938, and nothing in Professor
Soifer's verbal assault upon that opinion supports his view that the Court
has retreated from civil rights. In short, Professor Soifer, at least in this
section of his essay, completely misses the mark. Instead of a reasoned
discussion of two decisions over which reasonable minds could differ, the
reader is served with an exaggerated and rhetorically overdrawn attack on
the Court, an attack that will do little to further any serious effort to solve
problems of race in our society.

23. Soifer, supra note 2, at 393.
24. WEBSER'S Tm Nw INTEPNATioNAL DICTIONARY 1899 (1971).

